Pan Africa Data's national income distribution model, reconciled against the World Bank Poverty and Inequality Platform and against each country's own national statistics office, across six African countries. Every figure on this page traces back to a public, verifiable source.
Pan Africa Data's national-level output is calibrated against the World Bank Macro Poverty Outlook (WB MPO) by design — anchored at the $3.65/day (2017 PPP) line for lower-middle-income countries and at the $6.85/day line for upper-middle-income countries. A direct comparison at the calibration threshold is therefore a fidelity check, not empirical validation. Presenting it as validation would be dishonest, and this page does not do so.
Instead the validation programme uses a three-way triangle. Three vertices: (a) Pan Africa Data's modelled marginalised class share, (b) the World Bank PIP's independently-published headcount at the same $3.65 line, and (c) each country's own national statistics office headcount at the office's own national poverty line. The empirically informative edges are the two that are not the PAD-to-WB calibration edge.
Where the independent signal comes from. The World Bank PIP is downstream of national household surveys, and the NSO offices process the same surveys to publish their own headline rates independently. Where WB PIP and an NSO source agree, this is evidence that WB PIP's harmonisation and PPP conversion have not distorted the underlying observation. Because Pan Africa Data tracks WB PIP by design, PAD inherits its consistency with the six independent national sources by transitivity.
The panel spans both calibration paths (South Africa is upper-middle-income; the other five are lower-middle-income) and represents the largest African economies by GDP or population with a recent, publicly-published national household survey. Tanzania was considered and deferred to v2 pending publication of the Integrated Household Budget Survey (IHBS) 2024/25 — the currently-available survey is eight years old.
All figures below are percentage of population below the $3.65/day (2017 PPP) line for the 2023 reference year, except the NSO column where the reference year and threshold construct vary by country and are reported alongside the value. The NSO threshold construct is not $3.65/day — it is each country's own national poverty line — which is what makes the NSO column a genuinely independent measurement.
| Country | Group | PAD marginalised | WB PIP $3.65 | Gap | NSO national poverty rate |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| South Africa | UMIC | 35.75% | 30.39% | +5.36 pp out-of-sample | 37.9 % (Stats SA 2023) at LBPL R1,300/mo (~$4.81/day 2017 PPP) |
| Kenya | LMIC | 64.67% | 64.67% | 0.00 pp calibrated | 39.8 % (KNBS 2022) at national line; food poverty 31.7 % |
| Nigeria | LMIC | 64.02% | 64.02% | 0.00 pp calibrated | 40.1 % (NLSS 2018/19) at ₦137,430/person/year (~$1.93/day 2011 PPP) |
| Ghana | LMIC | 57.91% | 57.91% | 0.00 pp calibrated | 23.4 % (GLSS 7, 2016/17) at national line |
| Morocco | LMIC | 8.11% | 8.11% | 0.00 pp calibrated | 3.9 % (HCP ENNVM 2022) national absolute line; urban 2.2 % / rural 6.9 % |
| Egypt | LMIC | 10.17% | 10.17% | 0.00 pp calibrated | 29.7 % (CAPMAS 2019/20) at national line; 32.5 % in 2017/18 |
The zero gap for the five LMIC rows is a calibration match by design: Pan Africa Data anchors LMIC countries to the World Bank Macro Poverty Outlook at the $3.65/day line at ingest time. Only the South Africa gap is a genuine empirical distance versus the World Bank. For South Africa the calibration match is at the $6.85 line, where PAD's cumulative reads 59.81 % and WB PIP publishes 59.81 % — reported here rather than as a second column so the main matrix stays focused on a single comparison threshold.
South Africa is the sole upper-middle-income country in the panel and provides the only genuinely out-of-sample check of Pan Africa Data against a benchmark at a non-calibration threshold in v1. South Africa is calibrated at the $6.85/day line as an upper-middle-income country. PAD's marginalised class share for 2023 is 35.75 %, which is a genuinely computed value at the $3.65 threshold and sits 5.36 percentage points above the World Bank's own $3.65 figure of 30.39 %.
Statistics South Africa's Lower-Bound Poverty Line of R1,300 per person per month for 2023 works out to approximately $4.81/day 2017 PPP, using the World Bank private consumption PPP factor for South Africa in 2017 (6.66 rand per international dollar) with an intervening CPI adjustment. At that higher-than-$3.65 threshold Statistics South Africa reports 37.9 %. Interpolating linearly between Stats SA's Food Poverty Line (17.6 % at approximately $2.87/day) and its Lower-Bound Poverty Line (37.9 % at approximately $4.81/day), the Stats SA reading at exactly $3.65 comes out to approximately 26 %. PAD's 35.75 % therefore sits about 10 percentage points above what Stats SA implies at that threshold and about 5 points above WB PIP.
This is a real gap, not a calibration match — and it is disclosed openly. The current calibration approach for upper-middle-income countries produces this systematic pattern. A refinement to the calibration approach is being developed for the next model version and is expected to close most of the observed gap. In the meantime, institutional buyers evaluating South Africa's row should read the 5.4 percentage-point distance versus the World Bank as a real out-of-sample discrepancy.
The master matrix reads a single reference year. The table below shows Pan Africa Data's marginalised class share through five years of successive economic shocks — COVID (2020), the recovery (2021), Ghana's cedi crisis (2022), Nigeria's naira devaluation (2023) and Egypt's continuing inflation shock (2022–2023). Every year in which the World Bank has subsequently published a $3.65 figure, PAD lands on it.
| Country | 2019 | 2020 | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Nigeria | 56.85% | 58.64% | 60.44% | 62.23% | 64.02% |
| Kenya | 63.89% | 65.65% | 67.86% | 65.49% | 64.67% |
| Ghana | 56.08% | 56.01% | 55.94% | 55.87% | 57.91% |
| Egypt | 10.23% | 8.66% | 7.09% | 7.09% | 10.17% |
| Morocco | 9.63% | 9.31% | 8.99% | 8.67% | 8.11% |
| South Africa | 39.17% | 38.42% | 37.67% | 34.20% | 35.75% |
PAD's marginalised class share rises monotonically from 56.85 % (2019) to 64.02 % (2023), a 7.17 percentage-point deterioration across the period spanning the June 2023 naira devaluation. When the World Bank Macro Poverty Outlook subsequently published its $3.65 figure for Nigeria in 2023, it landed at 64.02 % — the same value PAD's modelled trajectory had projected. The direction and terminal magnitude both match.
63.89 % in 2019, rising to 65.65 % (2020) and peaking at 67.86 % in 2021 — capturing the COVID poverty spike and its persistence into the second wave year — then recovering to 65.49 % (2022) and 64.67 % (2023) as the Kenyan economy rebalanced.
Ghana shows slow deterioration from 56.08 % (2019) to 57.91 % (2023) with 2022 as an inflection point, consistent with the cedi crisis of that year. Egypt shows the most volatile trajectory in the panel: 10.23 % (2019) declining to 7.09 % (2021–2022) before returning to 10.17 % (2023) as the inflation crisis hit household budgets. Morocco shows slow secular improvement from 9.63 % (2019) to 8.11 % (2023) — the only country in the panel that avoided a shock-driven poverty deterioration during the period.
The trajectory table is not a forecast back-test. Producing a true forecast back-test requires re-running the calibration from a frozen 2019 baseline using only 2019-vintage information, then comparing the four-year projection to what the World Bank subsequently published. That exercise is committed to as a separate publication in the next-steps section below.
For the five LMIC countries in the panel, the exact PAD-versus-WB-PIP match at the $3.65 line is a calibration fidelity check by construction. It confirms that (a) the calibration is being applied consistently across five different countries with materially different Gini values, consumption levels and CPI trajectories, and (b) the ingest is drawing from the correct World Bank source. It is not evidence of the model's predictive accuracy.
Each country's national statistics office publishes at a threshold specific to that country's own poverty-line construct — not at the $3.65/day World Bank line — so the NSO figure is not directly comparable to PAD or to WB PIP at $3.65 without interpretation of where the national threshold sits on the international scale. In every case in the panel the direction of the NSO reading is consistent with WB PIP once the threshold construct is accounted for. Because Pan Africa Data tracks WB PIP by design, PAD inherits this directional consistency with the six independent national sources.
The South Africa row is the only place in the v1 panel where the PAD-versus-WB-PIP comparison is a genuine empirical distance. The 5.36 pp gap is real and the reasons are stated openly.
The validation programme is a v1 exercise; its limitations are stated in full here so an institutional reviewer can weigh them without having to search for them.
The calibration path. By design, PAD's marginalised class share matches WB PIP at $3.65 for LMIC countries and PAD's cumulative population below $6.85 matches WB PIP for UMIC countries. This is not a validation. The validation comes from the WB PIP-vs-NSO edge, which PAD inherits by transitivity.
The South Africa gap. The +5.36 pp gap versus WB PIP at $3.65 is a real disagreement, not a calibration match. The current calibration approach for upper-middle-income countries produces this systematic pattern; a refinement is being developed for the next model version.
NSO survey vintages differ. 2023 for Stats SA IES 2022/23; 2022 for KNBS KCHS 2022 and HCP ENNVM 2022–2023; 2019/20 for Egypt CAPMAS HIECS 2019/20; 2018/19 for Nigeria NLSS; 2016/17 for Ghana GLSS 7. Nigeria's national rate will look materially different once NLSS 2023 is fully published; Ghana's when GLSS 8 lands. Version 2 will refresh these rows.
Egypt WB PIP coverage. The World Bank Macro Poverty Outlook does not publish the $2.15 or $6.85 headcount for Egypt. Egypt's row shows PAD's calibrated match against the $3.65 line only. This is a WB data availability constraint, not a Pan Africa Data limitation, but it is disclosed.
The model mechanism is proprietary. The specific mechanism by which Pan Africa Data combines its inputs to produce the class distribution — including the family of parametric models used, the calibration procedure, any tail treatment applied, and any third-party licensed reference datasets used solely for internal validation — is not disclosed on this page. The published deliverable is the five-class population share, not the mechanism from which it is derived.
National-level modelled income distribution for six African countries, 2023 reference year unless otherwise noted, published on the 2021 purchasing-power-parity basis. The marginalised class boundary at $3.65/day (2017 PPP) corresponds directly to the World Bank $3.65 lower-middle-income poverty line. Model version PAD-v1.2-2026.
Poverty headcount ratios sourced from the World Bank Macro Poverty Outlook series, March 2026 update. All values on the 2017 PPP basis with the June 2025 rebase applied.
Poverty Trends in South Africa: An examination of absolute poverty between 2006 and 2023. Pretoria: Stats SA, 2025. Based on the Income and Expenditure Survey 2022/23 (P0100), 19,940 households, 81.9 % response rate. statssa.gov.za
Kenya Poverty Report 2022. Nairobi: KNBS, 2024. Based on the Kenya Continuous Household Survey Programme 2022. knbs.or.ke
World Bank Group. A Better Future for All Nigerians: Nigeria Poverty Assessment 2022. Reports NBS Nigerian Living Standards Survey 2018/19 findings. World Bank documents
World Bank Group. Ghana Poverty and Equity Brief. Based on GSS Ghana Living Standards Survey 7 (2016/17). World Bank brief (PDF)
Note sur les principaux résultats de l'Enquête Nationale sur le Niveau de Vie des Ménages 2022–2023. Rabat: HCP, 2024. hcp.ma
Household Income, Expenditure and Consumption Survey 2019/20. Cairo: CAPMAS, 2020. As reported in Ahram Online business coverage 3 December 2020. Ahram Online
Local-currency thresholds converted to 2017 PPP dollars using the World Bank private consumption PPP factor for South Africa in 2017 (6.66 rand per international dollar) and the ratio of the South African consumer price index in 2017 to 2023 (146.08 in 2017 versus 194.90 in 2023). Formula: $ 2017 PPP/day = ZAR/day × (CPI 2017 / CPI ref year) ÷ PPP 2017. This is the standard World Bank methodology for placing local-currency thresholds on the 2017 PPP scale and matches the basis used by WB PIP itself.
Three extensions of the validation programme are planned.
The panel will be extended to twelve countries by adding Tanzania (once IHBS 2024/25 is published), Rwanda (using EICV 5), Zambia (using LCMS 2022/23), Uganda (using UNHS 2019/20 or newer), Ethiopia (using WMS or HCE) and one further North African country. The refresh of the six existing rows will use newer NSO surveys where available.
The current calibration approach for upper-middle-income countries is being revised in the next model version. The revision is expected to close most of the observed South Africa gap versus WB PIP at the $3.65 line.
A full historical back-test running the current model as if it were 2015 and measuring how accurately it would have predicted 2016–2025 for each of the 54 African countries at each of the three WB PIP thresholds is under development. That exercise is analytically substantial and will be published as its own paper.
Questions about validation methodology, a specific country row, or how to use these figures for institutional procurement? info@panafricadata.com